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apply in the unique riot situation. Deadly force should be permitted
only in self-defense or to to protect another human life. Not only is
reform needed in the law, but also in the attitude of our police. They
must understand the social and economic plight of the ghetto
residents. They should learn the most modem technological methods
of suppressing a riot-methods of suppression which do not resort to
the unnecessary taking of human life. Both reforms are needed, but
the statutory change is needed first-to be a proclamation declaring
human life to be more valuable than property and to be an impetus for
police reform.
John William Bland, Jr.

PHYSIClANS AND SURGEONS-RIGiiT TO P-AcrcE iN HOSPrrAL-PUBLIC-

PivATE HosprrAL DIsTNCrON.-Dr. Stephen Burkhart brought suit
against the Community Medical Center of Livingston County, Kentucky demanding injunctive relief because the managers refused to
permit him to use the facilities of their hospital and refused to admit
his patients. The trial court sustained defendent's motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The trial court held that plaintiff had a right to practice in
the Community Medical Center only if it was a public hospital and
that a hospital is public only when it is supported by tax funds.
Plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed. Without announcing any rule of
law applicable to the facts of the case (which the Court did not

have before it), the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that appellant
had pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. In the Court's own words, "appellant pleaded sufficient
facts to get a foot inside the door of the court." Burkhart v. Community Medical Center, 432 S.W.2d 438 (Ky. 1968).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has had only one other occasion
to rule on the right of a physician to practice medicine in, and to
have his patients admitted by a particular hospital.' Then, it followed
1 Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 289 Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159 (1942).
A doctor was denied the right of operating in the hospital because as a general
practitioner he was performing operations usually reserved for specialists; to permit
him to so continue would have jeopardized the hospital's standing with the
American College of Surgeons whose indorsement was needed if the hospital was
to continue as an accredited hospital.
This case could have been decided without undue reliance on public/private
distinctions. A hospital, no matter whether it is designated public or private, has
the right to adopt reasonable regulations to insure an efficient, competent and well
run organization. A doctor who refuses to abide by these regulations forfeits his
right to practice in that hospital.
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the traditional approach, accepted in most jurisdictions, and recognized
a dichotomy between public and private hospitals. The Court allowed
judicial relief only against public hospitals and left all decisions concerning private hospitals within the discretion of the managing
authorities. 2 This approach is not in accord with modem constitutional
doctrine concerning individual rights. The issue is much broader than
whether a particular hospital happens to be supported by tax funds.
The relevant questions should be: (1) What criteria should be used to
distinguish a public from a private hospital? (2) Is a distinction
necessary in all cases?
A hospital, like other enterprises, can have a public nature without
being operated by the government or directly supported by tax funds.
Its public character is derived from the nature of the services provided3 or from the close association of the enterprise with an enterprise in fact operated by the state.4 There are a number of "private"
enterprises which may be categorized as having a "public" nature or
function, e.g., transportation, communications and utilities. A hospital
is no exception and perhaps has a greater public function than most
quasi-public activities. One test to determine the public nature of an
enterprise is whether the service in question would be provided by the
state if the private sector were not granted the privilege of providing
it. This test is particularly applicable to hospitals. No one could deny
that hospitals would exist even if the private sector did not establish
them. Under our form of political/economic organization, we prefer
to leave enterprises involving transportation, communications, utilities,
etc. in the hands of private business. That decision, however does not
abridge their public nature. We should recognize them for what they
are-instrumentalities of the state-and impose upon them duties to
the public corresponding to the rights they obtain when granted the
privilege of doing business. 5
2 For an excellent discussion of the development of this approach see Note,
The Physician's Right to Hospital Staff Membership: The Public-Private Dichotomy, 1966 WAsH. U.L.Q. 485.
3 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
4 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
5 Whenever any organization or group performs a function of a sufficiently
important public nature it can be said to be performing a governmental
function and thus should have its actions considered against the broad
provisions of the Constitution. In the racial covenant cases, the white
primary cases, and the company town cases, the Court 'has shown
that the concept of private action must yield to a conception of state
action where public functions are being performed. . . With the continuing 'pluralizing' of American society and the increasing recognition of
the governmental power of private groups, it can be forecast with some
certainty that this trend of the Court of public-izing private groups will
(Continued on next page)
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One of these duties should be to meet the requirements of due
process of law. This would deny to a hospital, a public enterprise
under the above definition, the right to take property 6 without first
according the aggrieved doctor the guarantees of due process, i.e.,
notice, a hearing, and a fair decision in accordance with that hearing.
The burden would be on the hospital and its managers to establish
reasonable grounds for denying the doctor's property right, and the
doctor would have the right of judicial review.
But is it always necessary in the first place to distinguish public
7
from private enterprises? Due process should be required of both.
The harm done to the individual is the same no matter how we
classify the institution. The expected argument to this doctrine is,
"Leave private enterprise free to run its own affairs without governmental intervention." But the practical effect of this doctrine serves
that purpose. By holding all corporations to constitutional standards,
the justification for legislative regulation is destroyed. "Constitutionalization"8 is a substitute for regulation.
The case precedent for applying doctrines of this type to hospitals,
as the Court observed, is limited.9 It did state that, "The sufficiency of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

continue. It is the important constitutional law development of the
mid-Twentieth century. Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security
State," 10 STAN. L. REv. 620, 656 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
GProtection of life, liberty and property contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, though speaking the old language of possessory
property and of individuals defending themselves against arbitrary feudal
government, does at least set up the implication that corresponding protection exists where the individual derives his economic life not from
possessory property, but from position in a modem industrial world.
Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of
Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U.PA.
REv. 933, 942 (1952).
7 Certain quasi-constitutional rules governing the behavior of corporations,
and of the officials within them, are beginning to be imposed by the
courts and by public opinion.... The emerging principle appears to be
that the corporation, itself a creation of the state, is as subject to constitutional limitations which limit action as is the state itself. If this
doctrine, now coming into view, is carried to full effect, a corporation
having economic and supposedly juridical power to take property, to
refuse to give equal service, to discriminate between man and man,
group and group, race and race, to an extent denying 'the equal protection of the laws, or otherwise to violate constitutional limitations, is
subject to direct legal action. Id.
8 Id. at 943.
0 B!ende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 893 P.2d 926
(1964); Raymond v. Cregar, 38 N.J. 472, 185 A.2d 856 (1962); Griesman v.
Newcomb Hosp., 76 N. J. Super. Ct. 149, 183 A.2d 878 (1962); Falcone v.
Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62 NJ. Super. Ct. 184, 162 A. 2d 324 (1960),
(Continued on next page)

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

the pleadings herein requires scrutiny of the rights, if any, of appellant to send his patients to and to practice medicine in appellees'
hospital."10 (Emphasis added.) That sentence can be read as an
invitation for the lower court to consider more than merely the
"private" status of the defendant hospital. It must consider also the
property rights of the doctor and the public nature of the hospital.
Clearly, the facts may be such that the hospital's actions were completely justified, but the Court is announcing here that that decision
will be made in a court of law and not left to the discretion of the

hospital.
Benjamin L. Dickinson
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

affd 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961). These cases involved the denial of

membership in medical societies because the doctors had received part of their
medical education at an osteopathic college. They bad been licensed by the
state. The courts required the granting of membership because: (1) the medical
societies were of a public nature due to their monopolistic control of facilities
(as in the present case); and (2) the doctors bad been licensed by the state and
it was against public policy for a medical society to overrule state action.
10 Burkhart v. Community Medical Center, 432 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Ky. 196&).

